Looking at the news feed on Yahoo the other day, I saw an article that a Dutch scientist, Ron Fouchier, has genetically modified the H5N1 bird flu virus to become much more contagious. In his work, presented at an influenza conference last September, Fouchier infected ferrets with the virus and then transmitted the virus between them. After ten generations and only five genetic mutations, a highly contagious airborne mutation developed. Although the H5N1 virus does not transmit easily to humans, it kills 50% of those infected. If this strain becomes as easily transmitted as the seasonal human flu, it potentially would result in an unprecedented pandemic with devastating consequences to the human race – up to 50% of the world’s population would be killed. Fouchier’s work has, therefore, created a real potential threat to humankind. [1]
This work has understandably stirred up controversy. Experts are debating whether the details should be published and if this type of research should even be conducted. As reported by Science Insider, Paul Keim, a geneticist who has conducted work on anthrax comments and chairs the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB): “I can't think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one. I don't think anthrax is scary at all compared to this.” Dr. Thomas Iglesby, a bioterrorism expert, adds: “It's just a bad idea for scientists to turn a lethal virus into a lethal and highly contagious virus. And it's a second bad idea for them to publish how they did it so others can copy it.” Scientists holding similar views argue for international monitoring of this type of research. [2]
The scientists worry that if the results are published, terrorists may repeat the work and hold the world hostage. There are other risks. What if the scientists manage to infect themselves? That may lead to a global pandemic if they are not immediately quarantined. What safety measures are the scientists taking to prevent self-infection? What if the virus manages to leak out into the environment? What measures may be taken to control its spread? Could these viruses jump into other animal vectors, killing them off and facilitating transmittal to humans? How is the new virulent strain eradicated after it is produced in these research studies? Fiction has explored this scenario. Stephen King’s apocalyptic bestseller The Stand, tells of a man-made flu virus strain that “got out of the bottle” and wiped out over 99% of the human population.
There are, however, clear benefits to this type of research. Fouchier’s work demonstrates that the H5N1 virus may easily mutate on its own to a virulent form and publishing his work may help us prepare for a deadly future flu pandemic, whether it would be this strain or another strain. [3] Vaccines may potentially be developed in advance of such a deadly pandemic, dramatically reducing the threat. Said research may even unlock the key to ultimate eradication of these types of viruses. To deflect the argument of a terrorist threat, terrorists may develop on their own deadly virulent viruses and this type of research may be needed to counteract these threats.
To gain more insight on how other controversial scientific issues have been handled, I looked at the issue of cloning human beings for reproductive purposes. Back in 2005 the United Nations weighed in with a non-binding prohibition. At the national level, only Australia and the UK have prohibited human cloning except certain Australian states permit it for certain therapeutic cases. In the European Union (EU), the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine prohibits cloning, but only three EU nationalities ratified the agreement. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights prohibits reproductive human cloning, which is legally binding for EU institutions. In the United States, there is no Federal guideline, but 13 states have banned reproductive cloning. No other countries have addressed the issue. [4] In this case, the scientific community has decided not to further pursue reproductive human cloning.
The NSABB has the difficult job of deciding whether or not to publish the Fouchier virulent deadly virus work. The agency, however, is a United States federal agency and does not have the authority to control what happens in the rest of the world. As this research affects all of the human population, an international group would be more appropriate to decide on such a matter; however, there are no appropriate groups. The United Nations has a relevant agency the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), but they only serve as an advisory body. In 2006, UNESCO issued a document, “Science Technology & Innovation Policy: The Role of Parliaments,” advising governments how to develop policies and governance covering the rapidly changing landscape in science and technology. Unfortunately, only the United States and Europe have created dedicated technology assessment agencies. Also, ad hoc international committees set up to look at these issues succumb to politics at home and due to election cycles, only are effective on short-term issues. [5]
To address these types of issues, UNESCO suggests an international forum of science committees consisting of the following stake-holders: scientists, national government representatives, industry, policy makers, journalists, and civil society. They further suggest that the forum may provide an arena for sharing policy-making experience, setting best practices for national science committees, strengthening partnerships between the various stakeholders, harmonizing national government regulations in science and technology, and exchanging related information. [6] I further suggest that said international forum also provide governance and policy on technologies that may have a profound impact on the world population, for instance, the modification of the H5N1 virus. Regrettably, in the current world political climate, this type of a forum may not be given this type of international authority.
Until an international forum is commissioned that has governance and policy making authority, we need to rely on scientists to self-govern their own work. Also, national governments need to form committees represented by scientists, industry, legislators, regulators and other stakeholders to oversee scientific developments in their own countries in order to provide policy setting and governance over potentially catastrophic technologies. Finally, all of us need to take accountability for technological developments within our spheres of influence, assess all the consequences, especially the unintended ones, and take the necessary actions to safeguard humanity from a catastrophe. This is especially critical today with the incredible advances being made in computation, genetics, and life sciences as well as other technology areas. The future of humanity depends on the decisions we make and the actions we undertake today.
References:
2. Ibid.
3. See [1]
4. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_cloning
5. http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/SC/pdf/pub_role_parliaments_en.pdf
6. Ibid.
No comments:
Post a Comment